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I. INTRODUCTION-SCOPE OF ARTICLE
HE authors have attempted to limit the reported cases to those
involving state law, developments in enforcement of the debtor-
creditor relationship, or cases that might not otherwise be ad-
dressed in a conventional bankruptcy survey. This is not an exhaustive
survey of bankruptcy developments, but rather an update regarding cases
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of interest to the Texas-based debtor-creditor practitioner.'
II. BANKRUPTCY IN THE SUPREME COURT
A. DISCHARGEABILITY-SETTLED FRAUD CLAIMS
In Archer v. Warner,2 the United States Supreme Court addressed
whether the unpaid portion of a fraud claim, later the subject of a com-
promise settlement agreement, remains non-dischargeable in a subse-
quent bankruptcy. 3
Archer originally sued Warner for fraud in the sale of a business. That
lawsuit was settled, and broad releases were executed; however, part of
the consideration was Warren's payment of $100,000 to Archer, evi-
denced by a promissory note. The state court case was dismissed with
prejudice.4
Warner defaulted under the note, and Archer sued to enforce it.
Warner filed Chapter 7 bankruptcy. Archer sought to have the debt evi-
denced by the note held non-dischargeable under Section 523(a)(2)(A).
The Fourth Circuit found that the settlement agreement and release was
essentially a novation that replaced the old fraud-related debt with a new
contractual obligation, which would be dischargeable in bankruptcy. 5
The Supreme Court reversed, however, finding the remaining debt evi-
denced by the note to be non-dischargeable. Although the settlement
agreement "completely addressed and released each and every underly-
ing state law claim," the agreement nevertheless left a debt owing, the
origin of which was Warner's fraud.6 Even acknowledging "a kind of no-
vation," the Court found Archer was not barred from showing that the
settlement debt arose out of "false pretenses, a false representation, or
actual fraud, in which event the debt would nevertheless remain non-dis-
chargeable under Section 523(a)(2)(A). ''7
At least one circuit court has applied Archer v. Warner in another dis-
1. For other surveys that focus exclusively on bankruptcy law developments, see J.
Westbrook & E. Warren, Recent Developments, University of Texas School of Law Bank-
ruptcy Conference (2003) (a national survey with a supplement containing Texas and Fifth
Circuit case summaries); L. Phillips and B. Brown, Recent Case Developments, 19th An-
nual Farm, Ranch & Agri-Business Bankruptcy Institute (2003); G. Pronske, Recent Devel-
opments, State Bar of Texas Advanced Business Bankruptcy Course (2003).
2. Archer v. Warner, 538 U.S. 314, 317 (2003).
3. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A) (2000) (claims resulting from actual fraud are non-
dischargeable).
4. Archer, 538 U.S. at 317.
5. Id. (the Court of Appeals opinion is found in In re Warner, 283 F.3d 230 (4th Cir.
2002)).
6. Id. at 318-19.
7. Id. at 323. The majority opinion relied on its earlier decision in Brown v. Felsen,
442 U.S. 127, 130 (1979), in which a consent decree and stipulation was entered in state
court. The Supreme Court held that collateral estoppel and claim preclusion issues arising
from the consent decree notwithstanding, the bankruptcy court was not precluded from
looking beyond the record of the state court proceeding (i.e., the consent decree) to deter-
mine whether the underlying debt was for money obtained by fraud.
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chargeability context. The settlement in In re DeTrano8 was embodied in
an agreed judgment; however, the court did not apply claim or issue pre-
clusion principles to block consideration of the dischargeability of the un-
derlying claim.9
Similarly, in In re Williams,'0 the Fifth Circuit reiterated in a Section
523(a)(6) context that the dischargeability of a debt was not litigated in a
prior district court case. In a subsequent bankruptcy, however, the claim
was found non-dischargeable.11
Two observations can be made as a result of these cases. First, to con-
tract away a potential Section 523(a) claim (assuming it can be done), the
drafter must call it what it is. In other words, any settlement agreement
should contain an express acknowledgment of the potential Section
523(a) claim and the fact that it is being released. A covenant not to sue,
with specific reference to dischargeability in a future bankruptcy, should
also be included.
Second, state court practitioners may have a bit less to be concerned
about regarding potential claim or issue preclusion issues in a later bank-
ruptcy. Although specific issues actually litigated in state court actions
(e.g., fraud or the like) may have consequences in a subsequent dis-
chargeability proceeding, in the absence of actual litigation of that issue,
it is quite possible for a state court claim to run its course while dis-
chargeability is preserved. 12
B. SIXTY DAY SECTION 727 COMPLAINT DEADLINE
NOT JURISDICIONAL
Under the Bankruptcy Rules, a creditor has sixty days after the date
first set for the first meeting of creditors to file a complaint either seeking
the dischargeability of certain indebtedness (Section 523) or objecting to
the debtor's discharge (Section 727). Kontrick v. Ryan 13 addressed a
complaint filed under Section 727, implicating Bankruptcy Rule 4004(a),
which governed the sixty-day time period for a Section 727 complaint,
8. In re Detrano, 326 F.3d 319 (2d Cir. 2003) (settlement of Section 523(a)(4) claim
embodied in agreed judgment still left open the non-dischargeable nature of the underlying
claim).
9. Id. at 322-23. Relying on Archer and Brown, the court stated:
Congress also intended to allow the determination whether a debt arises out
of fraud to take place in bankruptcy court, not to force it to occur earlier in
state court when non-dischargeability concerns "are not directly in issue and
neither party has a full incentive to litigate them."
Archer, 538 U.S. at 315.
10. In re Williams, 337 F.3d 504 (5th Cir. 2003).
11. Id. at 507-08 (also citing and quoting Archer).
12. For other commentaries on Archer, see generally Rebecca Callahan & Lisa
Mathaisel, Contracting Around the Debt Discharge Under Section 523(a)(2)(A), 27 CAL.
BANKR. J. 40 (2003); James D. Walker, Jr. & Amber Nickell, Bankruptcy, 54 MERCER L.
REV. 1351, 1371-72 (2003).
13. Kontrick v. Ryan, 124 S. Ct. 906 (2004).
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and Rule 4004(b), which addresses extensions of that time period.1 4
In Kontrick, the plaintiff creditor filed an amended complaint, with
leave of court, but well outside of any original or extended deadline
under Rule 4004. The amended complaint apparently added a new claim,
which was not in the original pleading. The creditor moved for summary
judgment, in response to which Kontrick moved to strike certain portions
of the summary judgment pleadings. Significantly, Kontrick did not ini-
tially address the new allegations in the amended complaint; rather, Kon-
trick's only pre-disposition action pertained to summary judgment
pleadings and not the late filed amendment. Only after an adverse ruling
on the merits did Kontrick raise the issue of the new allegations in the
amended complaint. 15
A unanimous Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Seventh Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals holding the time constraints pursuant to a procedu-
ral rule were not jurisdictional issues. Therefore, the debtor waived his
right to assert the untimeliness of the amended complaint by waiting until
after adjudication on the merits. With the rule non-jurisdictional in na-
ture, Kontrick was effectively left with an affirmative defense, which was
waived by not having been asserted in a timely defensive pleading. 16
C. OTHER PENDING MATTERS
As of the end of the Survey period, other bankruptcy issues were
pending before the United States Supreme Court. Of particular practical
interest is Till v. SCS Credit Corp.,'1 7 which should address the appropri-
ate measure of the "cram down" rate of interest for a secured claim in a
contested Chapter 13 plan. Other pending matters include compensation
of debtor's counsel from Chapter 7 estate funds, finance charge disclo-
sures under the Truth in Lending Act, and qualification as an ERISA
14. FED. R. BANKR. P. 4004(a), (b). The bankruptcy court may extend the sixty day
period "for cause" on a motion "filed before the time has expired." Id.
15. Kontrick, 124 S. Ct. at 918.
16. Id. at 910. As the Supreme Court noted:
[I]t is axiomatic that such rules do not create or withdraw federal jurisdiction
[citations omitted]. As Bankruptcy Rule 9030 states, the Bankruptcy Rules
"shall not be construed to extend or limit the jurisdiction of the courts." Id.
at 914.
Kontrick also noted that such procedural rules serve three purposes:
First, they inform the pleader, i.e., the objecting creditor, of the time he has
to file a complaint. Second, they instruct the court on the limits of its discre-
tion to grant motions for complaint-filing-time enlargements. Third, they af-
ford the debtor an affirmative defense to a complaint filed outside the Rules
4004(a) and (b) limits. This case involves the third office of the rules.
Id. at 916 (emphasis added). The Court did not address whether and to what extent such a
procedural rule "could be softened on equitable grounds." Id. Apparently, lower courts
are divided on whether Rules 4004 and 4007 (Section 523 complaints) allow equitable
exceptions.
17. For the lower court opinion, see In re Till, 301 F.3d 583 (7th Cir. 2002) (cert.
granted).
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plan participant. 18
III. BANKRUPTCY AND HOMESTEAD ISSUES IN THE
FIFTH CIRCUIT
A. DISCHARGEABILITY-WILLFUL AND MALICIOUS INJURY
In In re Williams,19 the Fifth Circuit addressed the non-dischargability
of damages resulting from a willful and malicious injury in the context of
an intentional breach of contract and a subsequent violation of a court
order. Section 523(a)(6) provides that a debt is non-dischargeable to the
extent it arises out of a "willful and malicious injury by the debtor to
another entity or to the property of another entity."' 20 According to the
Supreme Court, Section 523(a)(6) applies to "acts done with the actual
intent to cause injury," but it excludes intentional acts that result in unin-
tended injury.2 1
Following the Supreme Court's lead, the Fifth Circuit has held that for
Section 523(a)(6) to apply, "a debtor must have acted with 'objective sub-
stantial certainty or subjective motive' to inflict injury."'22 The Fifth Cir-
cuit further created an "implied malice" standard when a debtor acts
"with the actual intent to cause injury." The test for willful and malicious
injury, therefore, has been condensed by the Fifth Circuit into "a single
inquiry of whether there exists 'either an objective substantial certainty of
harm or a subjective motive to cause harm' on the part of the debtor. '23
In Williams, the debtor had violated the terms of a union collective
bargaining agreement. The violation was apparently intentional; however,
the court was not satisfied that the debtor actually knew the nature, ex-
tent, or certainty of any injury or damage arising out of the violation. The
court held that with the lack of that knowledge or substantial certainty of
injury, the court discharged the debt arising from the initial contractual
breach.24
A part of the union's claim, however, arose out of the debtor's subse-
quent violation of an agreed judgment and decree issued by a federal
district court. After an audit determined that the restitution the debtor
owed for non-compliance with the agreed judgment and decree, the dis-
trict court awarded a judgment for that amount (effectively finding Wil-
liams in contempt). The court found that the debtor's contempt rose to
the level of a willful and malicious injury, noting that "failure to obey a
18. See Lamie v. U.S. Tr., 538 U.S. 905 (2003) (attorney's fees); Household Credit
Servs. v. Pfennig, 539 U.S. 957 (2003) (disclosure of credit card fees); and Raymond B.
Yates, MD, PC Profit Sharing Plan v. Henton, 123 S. Ct. 2637 (2003) (ERISA
qualification).
19. Williams v. Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers (In re Williams), 337 F.3d 504 (5th Cir.
2003).
20. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) (2000).
21. Kawaauhau v. Geiger, 523 U.S. 57, 61 (1998).
22. Williams, 337 F.3d at 508-09 (citing In re Miller, 156 F.3d 598, 603 (5th Cir. 1998)).
23. Id. at 509 (citing Kawaauhau, 523 U.S. at 61-62).
24. Id. at 510-11.
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court order constitutes willful and malicious conduct, and a judgment
against a defiant debtor is excepted from discharge. '25
Arguably, Williams may not mean that all damages arising out of con-
tempt or violation of a court order are per se non-dischargeable. Al-
though the court provided an extensive analysis in support of its ruling on
the initial breach of contract, there was no separate analysis in support of
its conclusion on the contempt portion of the claim. However, notwith-
standing its lack of support, the court made it clear that "[c]ontempt may
be characterized as an act resulting in intentional injury. '26
B. DISCHARGEABILITY OF STUDENT LOANS
Section 523(a)(8) of the Bankruptcy Code governs dischargeability of
student loans, which are generally non-dischargeable unless they would
"impose an undue hardship on the debtor and the debtor's depen-
dents."'27 The Fifth Circuit addressed this issue in In re Gerhardt.28 In
addressing this issue for the first time, the Fifth Circuit adopted the test
first applied by the Second Circuit in In re Brunner.29 The so-called Brun-
ner test requires a three part showing by the debtor:
(1) That the debtor cannot maintain, based on current income and
expenses, a "minimal" standard of living for [himself] and [his] de-
pendents if forced to repay the loans;
(2) That additional circumstances exist indicating that this state of
affairs is likely to persist for a significant portion of the repayment
period of the student loans; and
(3) That the debtor has made good faith efforts to repay the loans.30
Mr. Gerhardt was described as a healthy, forty-three-year-old profes-
sional musician with a masters degree and who was the principal cellist
for the Louisiana Philharmonic Orchestra (he also supplemented his in-
come as a cello teacher). Applying the Brunner test, the court acknowl-
edged that the debtor's monthly expenses exceeded his monthly income
and that he did not have the present ability to maintain a minimal stan-
dard of living if forced to repay the loan. Thus, the debtor satisfied the
first component of the Brunner test. The second prong (persisting state
of affairs) was the debtor's weakness. The court found that the debtor
could "teach full time, obtain night-school teaching jobs, or even work as
25. Id. at 512 (citing In re Allison, 176 B.R. 60, 64 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1994)).
26. Id.
27. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (2000).
28. In re Gerhardt, 348 F.3d 89, 91 (5th Cir. 2003). At the outset, the Fifth Circuit
recognized that whether to apply a de novo review to the undue hardship determination
was a matter of first impression in the Fifth Circuit. Following other circuits, the Fifth
Circuit determined that this question of dischargeability is a question of law subject to de
novo review. Id.
29. Id. (citing Brunner v. N.Y. State Higher Educ. Servs. Corp., 831 F.2d 395, 396 (2d
Cir. 1987) (emphasis added)). Other circuits have adopted the Brunner test. See, e.g., In re
Cox, 338 F.3d 1238, 1241 (11th Cir. 2003); In re Saxman, 325 F.3d 1168, 1173 (9th Cir.
2003). See also In re Blair, 301 B.R. 181, 184 (Bankr. D. Md. 2003).
30. Gerhardt, 348 F.3d at 91 (quoting Brunner, 831 F.2d at 396). The debtor bears the
burden of proof on each of the Brunner elements. Id.
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a music store clerk. '31 Noting the potential avenues for additional in-
come, the court found that there was no reason beyond the debtor's con-
trol that would perpetuate his inability to repay his student loans. The
court also found that nothing in the Bankruptcy Code provided a debtor
with a pre-existing right to work only in a certain field or intentionally
remain in a low-paying job and yet still claim an undue hardship to repay
student loans.
As to the third prong of the Brunner test (efforts to repay the loan), the
debtor had virtually nothing to show the court. Although the court did
not actually reach the third prong, it seemed to emphasize that the debtor
had repaid only $755 of a $77,000 student loan debt, and found the debt
non-dischargeable. 32
This case is indicative of a number of recent court decisions addressing
this undue hardship exception to non-dischargeability of student loans. In
the absence of any statutory change, it is unlikely that the approach taken
by the Fifth Circuit will change anytime soon, and it is consistent not only
with the other circuit court opinions cited above, but with earlier bank-
ruptcy court decisions from Texas-based bankruptcy courts.33
Student loan cases produce results that can seem (and may indeed be)
harsh from the debtor's perspective and also come at the expense of pri-
vate sector creditors. For better or worse, these courts are doing no more
than applying what they perceive to be the clear congressional intent con-
tained in the statute, and any change will need to come from Congress.34
That said, a less restrictive application of the Brunner test may be de-
veloping, at least in other circuits. 35 A practice pointer: A common cir-
cumstance in many of the cases is the debtor's apparent disregard for
what is embodied in the third prong of the Brunner test. Many of the
unsuccessful debtors came into the bankruptcy court with no evidence of
any effort to repay their student loans. This was apparent in both
Gerhardt and in In re Hollins (an earlier case out of the Northern District
31. Id. at 92.
32. Id. at 92-93. "Our analysis of the second Brunner prong inevitably overlaps to
some degree with the third prong..." Id. at 92 n.3.
33. See, e.g., In re Murphy, 282 F.3d 868, 873 (5th Cir. 2002) (use of student loan
proceeds for living expenses did not affect non-dischargeability under 523(a)(8)); In re
Hollins, 286 B.R. 310, 316 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2002) (debtor could not maintain minimal
standard of living, but failed to establish inability to make payments in the future or that
she made good faith efforts to repay student loans).
34. For an example of the potentially harsh results that can befall a debtor, see In re
Wetzel, 213 B.R. 220, 225-26 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1996) (woman suffering from fibrocystic
breast disease, also the single mother of an autistic child, only allowed to discharge a por-
tion of her student loan debt). For a critical commentary of Section 523(a)(8), see B.J.
Huey, Comment, Undue Hardship or Undue Burden: Has the Time Finally Arrived for
Congress to Discharge Section 523(a) (8) of the Bankruptcy Code?, 34 TEX. TECH L. REV.
89 (2002); see also Jennifer L. Frattini, The Dischargeability of Student Loans: An Undue
Burden?, 17 BANKR. DEV. J. 537 (2001) (comments upon In re Wetzel).
35. See, e.g., In re Polleys, 356 F.3d 1302, 1309 (10th Cir. 2004) (Brunner "must be
applied such that debtor, who truly cannot afford to repay their loans may have their loans
discharged"); see also In re Long, 322 F.3d 549, 554 (8th Cir. 2003) ("totality of the circum-
stances" test less restrictive than Brunner).
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of Texas). 36 Whether this actually impacts the results of these or similar
cases is pure speculation; however, regardless of which test is applied, the
bankruptcy court is ultimately left with a difficult judgment call, and a
debtor who has made good faith efforts to repay his or her student loan
before seeking bankruptcy relief should certainly be in a better position
than the debtors in some of these cases.
C. RURAL HOMESTEADS IN TEXAS
The Fifth Circuit issued two opinions addressing the Texas rural home-
stead, which generally allows Texas debtors to claim up to 200 acres of
property "used for the purposes of a rural home .... ,,37
In In re Bouchie,38 the debtor claimed approximately eighty-five acres
of property as rural homestead, which the trustee and a trade creditor
asserted was urban in nature and therefore limited to ten acres. The court
had to determine the applicable test to use, given both historical develop-
ments in the common law and more recent amendments to the Texas
Property Code. Historically, courts applied a multiple-factor test first
adopted in United States v. Blakeman,39 and cases arising since Blakeman
had even applied a bifurcated test, which was a combination of an analy-
sis under the Texas Property Code combined with application of the so-
called Blakeman test.40
In 1999, Section 41.002 of the Texas Property Code was amended to
provide a more detailed statutory framework for determining when a
property is "urban. '41 Although the statute did not expressly state that it
was an exclusive test, the Bouchie court found that this most recent
amendment left no room for the Blakeman test or other common-law
schemes. Rather, Section 41.002 was found to be "the exclusive vehicle
for distinguishing between rural and urban homesteads. '42
Exclusive application of the Property Code amendments was not the
only issue addressed by the Bouchie court. The objecting creditor also
asserted that the bankruptcy court erred in not requiring the debtor to
show that the land was used "for rural purposes." The Fifth Circuit easily
disposed of this issue, stating that under Texas law, "all that is required
for rural homestead purposes is that the property be used as a home. '43
36. Hollins, 286 B.R. at 310.
37. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 41.002(b) (Vernon Supp. 2004).
38. In re Bouchie, 324 F.3d 780 (5th Cir. 2003).
39. U.S. v. Blakeman, 997 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir. 1992).
40. In re Perry, 267 B.R. 759, 766 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2001) (vacated on other grounds
by In re Perry, 345 F.3d 303 (5th Cir. 2003)).
41. Section 41.002 lists certain factors, such as location of the property within a munic-
ipality or its extraterritorial jurisdiction and service by police or fire protection and certain
utilities. If the property meets those criteria, then it is considered urban. TEX. PROP. CODE
ANN. § 41.002 (c) (Vernon Supp. 2004). Under Bouchie, if the property does not meet
those criteria, then it is considered rural, and that is the end of the inquiry.
42. Bouchie, 324 F.3d at 785.
43. Id. at 786. The court essentially disregarded an earlier Western District bankruptcy
court case. The court declined to follow In re Spencer, 109 B.R. 715 (Bankr. W.D. Tex.
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The same three judge panel addressed another rural homestead claim
in In re Perry.4 The facts in Perry were somewhat more complicated,
including the debtor's earlier conveyance of a twenty-six acre tract to a
wholly-owned corporation in anticipation of a bank loan some years ear-
lier. The court found that the earlier conveyance was not a sham, and that
record title to the property remained in the corporation. The debtor was,
however, found to maintain a possessory interest in the twenty-six acre
tract as an at-will tenant, which was sufficient to maintain a very limited
possessory homestead claim to the extent of the at-will tenancy.4 5
In Perry, the debtor used the twenty-six acre tract, along with an ad-
joining fifty-six acre tract, for the operation of a mobile home and RV
park, including related sewage treatment and recreation facilities. The
debtors lived on a 1.3 acre tract within the twenty-six acre tract. The
bankruptcy court found that the debtor had forfeited his homestead pro-
tection to all but the 1.3 acre home tract because of his operation of a
commercial business on the property. The Fifth Circuit disagreed, be-
cause the only fundamental requirement, as most recently stated in
Bouchie, was that the rural homestead must be "used for the purposes of
a rural home."'46
As a practical matter, rural homesteads had always been used not only
as a place for a home but also for the operation of a business, albeit agra-
rian in nature. In effect, farming or ranching activity was tantamount to
operating a business. According to Perry, the historical purpose of all
homestead exemptions "has been to protect not only the home, but also
the property that enables the head of the household to support the
family.",47
As noted in Bouchie, the Texas Supreme Court had not yet been
presented with this combination of a rural resident using his rural (home-
stead?) property for non-agricultural business purposes. Based in part on
the historical analysis of Perry, however, this is not much of a departure
from the historically agrarian uses in older cases, and the court allowed
the homestead claim.48
The court remanded the case to the bankruptcy court for a determina-
tion of whether and to what extent the operation of the mobile home and
RV park constituted an abandonment of all or a portion of the claimed
1989), which the Fifth Circuit described as "an outlier," which had never been relied upon
by any other bankruptcy court in the Western District. Bouchie, 324 F.3d at 786.
44. In re Perry, 345 F.3d 303 (5th Cir. 2003).
45. Id. at 315. This homestead interest would remain good against all general creditors;
however, this claim was essentially subject to the whim of the present or any subsequent
owner or other person with better title to the property, because of the at-will nature of the
underlying tenancy. See, e.g., Cleveland v. Milner, 170 S.W.2d 472, 475 (Tex. 1943).
46. Perry, 345 F.3d at 316.
47. Id. at 317.
48. Id. at 318. The court noted, however, that had the RV park been separated from
the residence, the case would have been decided differently. Apparently, the doctrine that
"property that is separated from the land on which the claimant resides must be used prin-
cipally for the purposes of the home if it is to be included in a claimant's rural homestead"
is still alive. Id. at 318 n.22.
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homestead. Arguably, the debtors not only operated a business on the
property, but much of the property was actually rented to other non-fam-
ily persons over the years of the park's operation. Noting that abandon-
ment is an affirmative defense, however, the court placed the burden of
carrying the abandonment issue on the objecting creditor.49
IV. BANKRUPTCY COURT CASES
A. NON-DEBTOR GUARANTORS-TEMPORARY INJUNCTION
In In re Bernhard Steiner Pianos USA, Inc.,5° a Northern District of
Texas bankruptcy court considered whether it could confirm a Chapter 11
plan providing for a limited injunction in favor of a non-debtor guaran-
tor.51 The debtor dealt in the sale, servicing, and consignment of both
new and used pianos. The debtor's president individually guaranteed
loans to certain floor plan lenders, and as of the bankruptcy filing, those
floor plan loans had not been repaid. Prior to plan confirmation, the floor
plan lenders had obtained relief and had repossessed their collateral still
on hand at the debtor.
Thereafter, the debtor filed a Chapter 11 plan contemplating repay-
ment to all of his creditors in full, including the floor plan creditors, who
by that time, were unsecured creditors with deficiency claims. The
debtor's plan classified consignment creditors separately from the general
unsecured creditors and proposed to pay those consignment creditors on
an expedited basis. The floor plan creditors objected to the plan on two
bases: First, the plan improperly classified consignment creditors sepa-
rately from other unsecured creditors and proposed to pay them more
quickly. Second, the plan provision that the only remedy for payment of
the floor plan lenders' unsecured debt (for so long as the Plan was not in
default) would be the Plan payments proposed, was an improper injunc-
tion recovery from the non-debtor guarantor.52
The bankruptcy court held that the debtor had presented a sound busi-
ness reason for the separate classification, because the debtor's undis-
puted testimony was that development of future consignment business
was critical to its successful reorganization, and without expediting pay-
ment to consignment creditors, the debtor could not get any new consign-
ment business. 53
Turning to the non-debtor guarantor issue, the Court found that the
plan proposed that the guarantor was not discharged or released from
any liability under the plan, and therefore, the plan did not purport to
49. Id. at 319-20.
50. In re Bernhard Steiner Pianos USA, Inc., 292 B.R. 109 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2002)
[hereinafter Bernhard Steiner].
51. Id. Generally, in a bankruptcy case, a plan of reorganization cannot be confirmed
if it releases guarantors of a debtor's debt and a creditor objects to the release. See Repub-
lic Supply Co. v. Shoaf, 815 F.2d 1046, 1050 (5th Cir. 1987).
52. Bernhard Steiner, 292 B.R. at 111-13.
53. Id. at 114. The court further held that no evidence of gerrymandering had been
offered at the confirmation hearing.
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grant a release to a non-debtor third party. Further, the bankruptcy court
found that nothing in the plan affected the guarantor's ultimate liability
under the guarantee agreement; it merely controlled the timing of when a
claim, if any, against the guarantor could be brought. 54
The debtor effectively requested something more akin to a temporary
injunction, which could be allowed under unusual circumstances, as op-
posed to a permanent injunction, which would be prohibited under the
Fifth Circuit's ruling in Feld v. Zale Corp. (In re Zale Corp.).55 The Bern-
hard Steiner court found that the plan, as modified at confirmation, did
not affect the guarantor's ultimate liability to the objecting creditors be-
cause the objecting creditors were being repaid in full. The tolling of lim-
itations on the causes of action against the guarantor pending the
repayment preserved any causes of action for the objecting parties, and
the debtor's undisputed testimony was that the guarantor was the sole
director and driving force behind the success or failure of the debtor's
business.56 As a result, if the debtor was forced to defend state court
lawsuits, it would be a considerable drain on his resources, which could
be better used to navigate the debtor's day-to-day business efforts. Thus,
the totality of the circumstances and criteria required under Zale had
been met.57
B. HOMESTEADS & EXEMPTIONS
Another interesting twist in the continuing homestead litigation saga
was reviewed in In re Brown,58 in which the court had to consider
whether the debtors, whose primary residence was on a Texas military
base, could exempt their interest in a Florida vacation timeshare as their
homestead under 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(1). The Chapter 13 trustee objected
to the exemption contending that the timeshare could not constitute a
residence for purpose of the federal exemption. The court started with a
finding that the Code did not define the term "residence," but that the
legislative history of the Code showed that the section did intend to pro-
vide debtors with a homestead exemption. The court then turned to Flor-
ida law on homestead exemptions, which is fairly similar to Texas law,
and requires the establishment of a homestead by actual intention to live
permanently in a place, coupled with actual use and occupancy. The
timeshare did not fit within the definition of a homestead established by
Florida courts because the debtors maintained their permanent residence
on a Texas military base, and had neither intention nor ability to change
their permanent residence to the timeshare, which they could occupy only
for a limited time period each year.59
54. Id. at 116.
55. In re Zale Corp., 62 F.3d 746 (5th Cir. 1995); see, e.g., In re Seatco, Inc., 257 B.R.
469 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2001) (temporary injunction allowed).
56. Bernhard Steiner, 292 B.R. at 117.
57. Id. at 117-18.
58. In re Brown, 299 B.R. 425, 426 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2003).
59. Id. at 427-28.
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A case that shows that creditors and trustees should review a debtor's
exemption claims closely is found in In re Martinez.60 The debtors filed
their case under Chapter 13 and listed in their schedules as exempt a
personal injury claim. They listed the estimated market value of the
claim to be $10,000 and claimed 100% of the value of the exemption, as
opposed to attempting to exempt a specific amount. The debtors included
a similar description of that claim in their Schedule B of personal prop-
erty, showing it as a contingent and unliquidated claim with an estimated
value of $10,000.61
After the deadline for objection to exemptions under Bankruptcy Rule
4003, the claim was settled for $23,000. The debtors moved for approval
of the settlement and authorization of disbursements. The Chapter 13
trustee objected to the settlement because the exemption was limited to
the debtors' estimate of the value of the claim in their schedules and that
no disbursement of proceeds was allowable whether the funds were ex-
empt or non-exempt, because the funds constituted additional disposable
income which had to be used in funding the debtors' plan.62
The court determined that the debtors, having claimed 100% of the
asset as exempt, were entitled to the full amount that was recovered, fur-
ther determining that the $10,000 stated value of the personal injury
claim was merely an estimate. Once it had made the determination that
the full amount of the settlement proceeds were exempt, the court logi-
cally found that it was not part of the estate. Because the claim was ex-
cluded from the estate, the court determined that it had no authority over
distribution of the proceeds nor jurisdiction to hear or determine the set-
tlement motion.63
Obviously, diligent creditors should scrutinize debtors' schedules
closely to make sure they do not try to use this "estimate" and percentage
method to exempt more than they would be entitled to under the Code.
C. CHAPTER 13-EARLY LIEN RELEASE
An area in which there appears to be a conflict in decisions not only
between bankruptcy judges in different districts in Texas, but even within
the same district, is the issue of early release of a lien in a Chapter 13
bankruptcy upon payment of the secured portion of a claim before com-
pletion of the plan.
One of the most recent decisions in the area is In re Day,64 which came
out of the Northern District of Texas. Ford Motor Credit Company
("FMCC") objected to confirmation of the debtor's Chapter 13 plan and
specifically objected to the plan provision that required FMCC to release
its lien upon full payment of the stated value of the collateral, which was
60. In re Chaparro Martinez, 293 B.R. 387 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2003).
61. Id. at 388.
62. Id. at 388-89.
63. Id. at 389-90.
64. In re Day, 292 B.R. 133 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2003).
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scheduled to occur after forty-seven months of the debtor's fifty-eight-
month plan. This would have required FMCC to release its lien prior to
plan completion and the debtors' receipt of their discharge.65
The Day court reviewed In re Thompson and In re Gray, prior cases in
the Northern District of Texas, which had reached conflicting results on
this issue. 66 The Day court opined that the Thompson court had held that
a Chapter 13 plan was a "new contract," containing bilateral covenant
considerations, and recognized that if the debtor's case was dismissed
prior to completion of the plan payments and discharge, Section 349(b)
worked to unravel the bankruptcy in the Code's attempt to leave the par-
ties as it found them. In that situation, upon dismissal of a debtor's Chap-
ter 13 bankruptcy case, title to the collateral would revest in the debtor
and the secured parties' interest in the property revests in the secured
creditor. Thus, if the lien could be released prior to discharge, this would
potentially frustrate revesting of the pre-bankruptcy rights of the parties,
and the creditor's lien in the collateral could possibly be prevented from
being reinstated if the debtor sold the property to a third party between
the time a lien could be forced to be released and dismissal of the
debtor's case. 67
The Day court opined that Gray had started within the premise that
lien stripping was available in Chapter 13 cases. The Gray court then re-
viewed Section 1325 of the Code, which generally provides that the plan
must comply with provisions of the Code. Next, the Gray court used Sec-
tion 1322(b)(10), which allows any plan provision "not inconsistent" with
the Code, to conclude that the Code allows confirmation of a plan that
contains a lien release provision. This conclusion was based on reading
together Section 1322(b)(a), which permits vesting of property with the
debtor on confirmation, with Sections 1327(a)-(b), which provide that,
except as otherwise stated in the plan, property vests in the debtor free
and clear of liens. In addition, the Gray court had addressed Sections
1322(b)(2) and 1325(a)(5)(B), as well as Section 506, and found that they
contained nothing that prohibited a provision requiring a release of lien
upon payment of the secured portion of a claim. Finally, the Gray court
found that neither Section 1328, which addresses Chapter 13 discharges,
nor Section 349, which addresses the effect of a case dismissal, prohibited
a lien release provision. 68
The Day court indicated that both of the earlier opinions were persua-
sive, but the court ultimately sided with Thompson, holding that a provi-
65. Id. at 134. Unlike a Chapter 11, a Chapter 13 discharge is typically granted only
upon successful completion of a debtor's plan obligations. 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a) (2000).
66. Compare In re Thompson, 224 B.R. 360, 367 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1998) (holding that
a secured creditor could not be forced to release its security interest until all payments
were made by the debtor under the Plan and the debtor had received a discharge) with In
re Gray, 285 B.R. 379, 389 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2002) (finding no prohibition in the Code
included in the Chapter 3 plan of provision requiring release of a secured creditor's lien
upon satisfaction of the secured claim).
67. Day 292 B.R. at 135 (citing Thompson, 224 B.R. at 366-67).
68. Id. at 135-36 (citing Gray, 285 B.R. at 386-89).
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sion requiring a lien release prior to completion and discharge was
inconsistent with the Code. 69 The Day court also held that neither of the
prior decisions had addressed whether the property at issue was exempt
property, questioned whether Section 349 was even applicable, or
whether in the case of such exempt property, the court should instead
look to Section 522(c). 70
Accordingly, the Day court held that a debt, which incorporates both
secured and unsecured portions claim, did not go away in a Chapter 13
case until a discharge was granted which, in turn, occurred only upon
completion of the Chapter 13 plan. 71 While debtor and creditor could
certainly agree that the creditor would release its lien upon payment of
the secured portion of its claim in return for a shorter payout, the Code
could not be construed to allow, over a creditor's objection, a provision
requiring release of lien upon payment of the secured portion of the
claim and before completion of the plan and granting of discharge to the
debtor.72
Another thoughtful opinion on this issue, coming out of a Western Dis-
trict of Texas Bankruptcy Court, is In re Smith,73 in which bankruptcy
judges King and Clark confirmed a number of Chapter 13 plans condi-
tioned upon the deletion of early lien release provisions.74
D. STATE LAw-LIMITATIONS ON REAL ESTATE LIEN DEBT
Section 16.035 of the Texas Property Code provides the statute of limi-
tations for the enforceability of a lien against real property. In short, the
limitations period is four years from the date the cause of action accrues,
which typically means the date of maturity of the debt secured by the real
property. This limitation extends to the exercise of a power of sale in a
deed of trust, which likewise must be made not less than four years after
maturity.75
Upon expiration of the four year limitations periods, "the real property
lien and a power of sale to enforce the real property lien become void." 76
Section 16.036 provides the exclusive means by which a real property lien
may be extended in order to remain enforceable under the limitations
period. Essentially, any extension agreement must be in writing, signed
69. Id. at 136.
70. Id. (citing 11 U.S.C. §522(c)(2)(A) which states that property is not generally liable
for pre-petition debts of the debtor except debt secured by a lien against the exempt
property).
71. Id. at 137 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a) (2000)).
72. Id. at 138.
73. In re Smith, 287 B.R. 882 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2002).
74. Id. at 884-88. "What is different in Chapter 13, however, is that the debtor's dis-
charge is delayed until the debtor completes the plan. 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a). Indeed, most of
the benefits of the Chapter 13 process are deferred until completion of the debtor's plan."
Id. at 885.
75. TEX. CiV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.035 (Vernon Supp. 2004).
76. Id. § 16.035(d).
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by the parties, acknowledged, and recorded. 77
In In re Tilton,78 the debtor and a lender executed one or more written
extension agreements; however, the most recent extension had not been
recorded, and from the state of the public record, the maturity date ap-
peared to be December 21, 1995. On June 7, 2001 (over four years after
maturity of the last recorded extension), the obligor filed for Chapter 7
relief. The Chapter 7 trustee sought to avoid the bank's lien because it
appeared of record to be barred as of the petition date. This was based
upon the trustee's status of a hypothetical judicial lienholder or a bona
fide purchaser, who, under state law, could rely on the state of the record
and assume that the lien had become void.79
The court held for the trustee, concluding that limitations applicable to
real estate debt in Texas runs from the maturity date of the note, and
where a renewal agreement is not recorded, it is void as against a bona
fide purchaser, including a bankruptcy trustee. The court found that the
bank's lien was void and of no force and effect against the trustee as of
the petition date. 80
V. OTHER CREDITORS' RIGHTS CASES
A. TEXAS FORECLOSURE PRACTICE
1. Duties of a Substitute Trustee
In Powell v. Stacy,81 the Fort Worth Court of Appeals reviews the prac-
tical realities of foreclosing a deed of trust lien. The opinion also reviews
the duties of a trustee or substitute trustee under a deed of trust when
that person is counsel for the lender, which is a common practice in
Texas.
Early on in the enforcement activities, the noteholder's attorney sent a
notice of acceleration, which was later withdrawn because the attorney
discovered that one of the makers actually lived on the subject property.
Notice was then provided under Section 51.002(d) of the Texas Property
Code, which requires a twenty-day notice and opportunity to cure when
the debt is secured by the debtor's principal residence.82
77. Id. § 16.036.
78. In re Tilton, 297 B.R. 478, 483 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 2003).
79. TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 16.037 (Vernon Supp. 2004). "An extension
agreement is void as to a bona fide purchaser for value ... who deals with real property
affected by a real property lien without actual notice of the agreement and before the
agreement is acknowledged, filed, and recorded." Id.
80. Tilton, 297 B.R. at 483-84. The court also refused to put the trustee on any addi-
tional level of inquiry based on the prior deed of trust or the earlier renewal agreement.
The court also refused to find that the debtor's schedules somehow resurrected an expired
lien or corrected an improperly perfected one. Id. at 485.
81. Powell v. Stacy, 117 S.W. 3d 70, 71 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2003, no pet.).
82. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 51.002(d) (stating "Notwithstanding any agreement to
the contrary, the holder of the debt shall serve a debtor in default under a deed of trust or
other contract lien on real property used as the debtor's residence with written notice by
certified mail stating that the debtor is in default under the deed of trust or other contract
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The notice letter provided the required cure deadline, along with a
statement of principal and interest, both of which overstated the amount
actually owed. One of the makers hired counsel, who requested clarifica-
tion of the amounts owed. The lender's lawyer did not respond, and
neither borrower made any further payments on the note. After waiting
some additional time to see if the borrowers could sell the property, the
noteholders ultimately sent notice of acceleration. The lender's lawyer
again quoted principal and interest, both of which were still in excess of
the amount owed. The letter went to the borrowers' last known address;
however, the borrower in possession had since moved but had not given
the noteholder a change of address. The notice was not sent to the bor-
rower's counsel.83
A trustee's sale ensued, and the noteholders purchased the property by
credit bid of $55,000. One of the borrowers challenged the entire process,
complaining of nearly every step taken by the lender and its counsel.
First, the borrower challenged the acceleration because of the lack of a
response to a general inquiry by borrower's counsel. The court noted,
however, that the borrowers ultimately had 159 days within which to cure
any default. At no time during this extended period did either borrower
submit any payment. "[T]he fact that there may have been a dispute
about the total amount of outstanding principal and interest due on the
note before acceleration did not excuse [the borrowers] from making
payments on the note from April to November 2000. '"84
Next, the borrower asserted that the noteholders owed the borrowers a
duty of good faith and fair dealing, which was purportedly breached by
the inaccurate notice and failure to respond to the earlier inquiries about
the note balance. The court noted, however, the long-standing principle
that "the duty of good faith and fair dealing is ordinarily not imposed on
the mortgagor/mortgagee relationship. '85
The borrower also argued that the note, which was a negotiable instru-
ment, was subject to the UCC's good faith requirement. 86 The court
found, however, that any notice of intent to accelerate and notice of ac-
celeration was expressly waived in the note; therefore, the borrowers
were not entitled to notice in the first place. The only notice recognized
by the court was the notice and opportunity to cure requirement found in
Section 51.002(d) of the Property Code. The court found that the notice
letter under the Property Code "contained all the information required
by Section 51.002, which does not require the noteholder to include the
lien and giving the debtor at least 20 days to cure the default before notice of sale can be
given under Subsection (b) .. "
83. Powell, 117 S.W.3d at 77 (noting that additionally, one of the borrowers was in jail
for a period of months during this time).
84. Id. at 73.
85. Id. at 74 (citing FDIC v. Coleman, 795 S.W.2d 706, 709 (Tex. 1990)).
86. Id. at 75; see TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 1.201(20), .304 (Vernon 1994 &
Vernon Supp. 2003). The UCC imposes a duty of good faith; however, it is defined as
"honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing."
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amount that would be due after acceleration. ' 87 With no evidence that
the noteholder or counsel did anything more than make a mistake in cal-
culating the amounts due, there was no evidence of dishonesty in fact,
and thus no violation of any duty of good faith found in the UCC.88
The borrower also claimed that the substitute trustee violated his duty
of fairness and impartiality. It is clear that a trustee becomes "a special
agent for both parties, and he must act with absolute impartiality and
with fairness to all concerned in conducting a foreclosure." 89 Addition-
ally, the trustee must conduct the sale fairly and he should not discourage
bidding by statements made before or during the sale. That said, the trus-
tee "has no duty to take affirmative actions beyond that required by stat-
ute or the deed of trust to ensure a fair sale." 90
The court found that the trustee abided by the terms of the deed of
trust and the Property Code. Of interest to practitioners, the court also
found that "the fact that he was also representing the [noteholders] does
not show that he breached his duty of fairness and impartiality." 91
Finally, the borrower also claimed that the erroneous payoff informa-
tion constituted an irregularity in the sale that resulted in a grossly inade-
quate sale price. Turning again to the limited duties of the trustee, the
court held that "[a] trustee owes no duty to provide either the debtor or
any potential bidders at the foreclosure sale any information about the
payoff amount of the underlying obligation. '92 Thus, the sale was upheld.
2. Notice to Inferior Lien Claimants
TMS Mortgage, Inc. v. Golias93 provides a somewhat different twist on
the well-settled concept that an inferior lien claimant is not entitled to
notice of a trustee's foreclosure sale under a deed of trust. In TMS, the
borrower defaulted under both its first and second lien payment obliga-
tions. A bankruptcy followed, and the holder of the first lien filed a mo-
tion for relief from the automatic stay. A local rule required that motions
to lift stay be served on all parties claiming an interest in the property
including, for example, junior lienholders. 94
Golias, the second lienholder, was not scheduled by the debtor, and
counsel for the first lienholder did not notify Golias of the motion. By the
time TMS (the first lienholder) foreclosed, it was six months after the stay
was lifted, and TMS had run a title report and was aware of the Golias
87. Powell, 117 S.W.3d at 75; see also TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 51.002(d) (Vernon
Supp. 2004).
88. Powell, 117 S.W.3d at 74.
89. Id.
90. Id. see also Hammonds v. Holmes, 559 S.W.2d 345, 347 (Tex. 1977).
91. Powell, 117 S.W.3d at 74. See also Sanders v. Shelton, 970 S.W.2d 721, 726-27 (Tex.
App.-Austin 1998, pet. denied.) (trustee under no duty to disclose payoff information;
inadequacy of consideration alone does not render foreclosure sale void).
92. Powell, 117 S.W.3d at 75.
93. TMS Mortgage, Inc. v. Golias, 102 S.W.3d 768 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2003, no
pet.).
94. Id. at 769-70 (discussing LOCAL R. 4001 in effect in the Eastern District of Texas).
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lien claim. TMS did not, however, notify Golias of the foreclosure "be-
cause Texas law does not require such notice."'95
The court focused on state law, and it reiterated that nothing in the
Property Code "requires the holder of a superior lien to contact junior
lienholders before conducting a trustee's sale."'96 The court further found
no fiduciary relationship between TMS and Golias, so there could be no
breach of a fiduciary duty (nor was there any ordinary negligence by the
first lienholder). The court refused to impose any new common-law duty
that did not already exist, and any remedy for the apparent failure of
TMS to comply with the local rule of a bankruptcy court should have
been asserted in that court. 97
VI. FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT
Two district court opinions during the Survey period may be of interest.
In Goswami v. American Collections Enterprise, Inc.,98 a district court
held that the use of the phrase "priority letter" on the outside of a debt
collector's envelope to a debtor did not violate the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act. Similarly, creditor's use of the word "amnesty" in the en-
closed letter did not violate the Act. The court apparently used an "unso-
phisticated consumer standard," but it found that "amnesty" did not
imply any sort of a threat of criminal action. Thus, the court found that
"nothing in the letter was dishonest" and the Act was not violated.99
Additionally, the unreported decision in Bergs v. Hoover, Bax, &
Slovacek, L.L.P.100 addressed allegations under both the Fair Debt Col-
lection Practices Act and the Texas Debt Collection Act. A central issue
was whether a law firm who conducted foreclosure activity constituted a
"debt collector" under the Act. In short, the court found that merely in-
stituting foreclosure proceedings does not constitute debt collection
under the FDCPA, and the defendant law firm was granted summary
judgment.101
95. Id. at 770.
96. Id. at 771.
97. Id. at 771-72. Any cause of action arising out of conduct in litigation would require
malfeasance rather than mere misfeasance. The remedy for misfeasance as opposed to
some form of affirmative wrongdoing in the judicial process "is to seek judicial relief as
part of that process." Id. at 772 (citing Prappas v. Meyerland Cmty. Improvement Ass'n,
795 S.W.2d 794, 797 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, writ denied)).
98. Goswami v. Am. Collections Enter., Inc., 280 F. Supp. 2d 624,627 (S.D. Tex. 2003).
99. Id. at 626-27. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e-1692f (2000).
100. Bergs v. Hoover, Bax & Slovacek, L.L.P., No. CIV.A.3:01-CV-1572-L, 2003 WL
22255679 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 24, 2003).
101. Id. at *4. The court relied primarily on two reported decisions. See Hulse v.
Ocwen Fed. Bank, 195 F. Supp. 2d 1188 (D. Or. 2002); Heinemann v. Jim Walter Homes,
Inc., 47 F. Supp. 2d 716 (N.D.W. Va. 1998) aff'd 173 F.3d 850 (4th Cir. 1999) (foreclosing
on property under a deed of trust is not a debt collection activity under the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act).
[Vol. 57
